

Dignity, face, and honor cultures: A study of negotiation strategy and outcomes in three cultures

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Summary

This study compares negotiation strategy and outcomes in countries illustrating dignity, face, and honor cultures. Hypotheses predict cultural differences in negotiators' aspirations, use of strategy, and outcomes based on the implications of differences in self-worth and social structures in dignity, face, and honor cultures. Data were from a face-to-face negotiation simulation; participants were intra-cultural samples from the USA (dignity), China (face), and Qatar (honor). The empirical results provide strong evidence for the predictions concerning the reliance on more competitive negotiation strategies in honor and face cultures relative to dignity cultures in this context of negotiating a new business relationship. The study makes two important theoretical contributions. First, it proposes how and why people in a previously understudied part of the world, that is, the Middle East, use negotiation strategy. Second, it addresses a conundrum in the East Asian literature on negotiation: the theory and research that emphasize the norms of harmony and cooperation in social interaction versus empirical evidence that negotiations in East Asia are highly competitive. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Culture is the unique profile of a society, extending from easily observable behaviors and the social institutions to impalpable psychological values and norms (Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). Research on culture in organizational behavior has primarily focused on East–West comparisons, relying on traditional theories that classify cultures as individualistic versus collectivist (Hofstede, 1980), independent versus interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), or hierarchical versus egalitarian (Hofstede, 1980) to account for cultural differences. In an in-depth review of literature using this cultural framework, Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson (2006) concluded that whereas Hofstede's values continue to be relevant to cross-cultural research, there is a disproportionate emphasis on individualism–collectivism in cross-cultural research, and this emphasis leaves theoretical and empirical gaps in cross-cultural literature.

In this study, we address some of the gaps in cross-cultural negotiation research by drawing hypotheses for a comparative cultural study of negotiating a new business relationship in Qatar, China, and the USA from a new framework in cultural psychology (Leung & Cohen, 2011). This framework builds on the nature of self-worth incumbent in independence–interdependence theory and proposes that a unique third type of culture, honor, characterizes cultures that exist across the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. We use this framework in three ways: first, to choose exemplars of dignity (USA), face (China), and honor cultures (Qatar), recognizing that

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although national boundaries generally provide good proxies for cultural boundaries (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012; Peterson & Smith, 2008), there is always variation within nations; second, to show that people from these three nations describe their cultures consistently with the conceptualizations of dignity, face, and honor culture; and third, to develop hypotheses concerning cultural differences in use of negotiation strategy and in outcomes. In using exemplar nations to represent cultures, we recognize that culture is not deterministic and that there will be differences within cultural types.

This three-culture comparative study makes two important contributions to our understanding of culture and negotiation strategy. First, it proposes how and why people in a previously understudied part of the world, that is, the Middle East, use negotiation strategy. Past research, based on the individualism–collectivism framework, simply assumes such regions are collectivist, without considering how Middle Eastern cultures might be different from East Asian cultures. Second, it addresses a contradiction in the East Asian negotiation research between the theory that emphasizes the norms of harmony and cooperation in social interactions (Gelfand et al., 2013; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003) versus the mounting empirical evidence that negotiations in East Asia are highly competitive (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Liu, Friedman, & Hong, 2012; Rosette, Brett, Barsness, & Lytle, 2012).

Dignity, Face, and Honor Cultures

The theories of individualism–collectivism and independence–interdependence primarily distinguish cultures by the degree to which people's social identity is independent versus interdependent with their social roles. Social identity is one of cultural psychology's core concepts. The basis of social identity is self-worth—a person's view of his/her value in society (Ayers, 1984). Self-worth is an outcome of the self-construal process—it is a construal of the way a person views him/herself in relation to others. In collectivist cultures, identity is interdependent with the fulfillment of role obligations to family, community, and society. In individualistic cultures, identity is relatively less dependent on fulfilling fixed social role obligations that govern collectivist cultures and, instead, is manifest in personal achievement and autonomy (Hofstede, 1980; Kitayama & Park, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 2001). Leung and Cohen (2011) propose that there is yet a third way to construe identity, called honor, which is characteristic of people in cultures in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. They extend the traditional theorizing in cultural psychology by proposing that the basis for self-worth in a culture varies along with the stability and hierarchical nature of the culture's social structure. To understand Leung and Cohen's (2011) conceptualization, we first review the nature of self-worth in three types of culture: dignity, face, and honor.

Dignity is self-worth based on the individual's achievements in pursuit of the individual's goals and values (Schwartz, 1994). Dignity does not depend on others' esteem (Ayers, 1984; Leung & Cohen, 2011) or their assessment of whether role obligations are being met. People in dignity cultures take on role obligations, but their obligations are temporally limited. As one obligation is fulfilled, people in dignity cultures are free to choose new ones. They do not have to follow the goals and obligations dictated by the social groups to which they belong (Schwartz, 1994). Dignity is not reputation conferred extrinsically by others; rather, it is intrinsically determined by people's own assessments of whether they are meeting their standards and achieving their own goals. As a result, an individual's dignity is not easily challenged by others (Ayers, 1984). All of these characteristics of self-worth in dignity cultures generate a wide acceptance of self-interest and autonomy. Unlike cultures where self-interest is controlled by social monitoring and sanctioning, in dignity cultures, self-interest is constrained by an effective system of law that enforces contracts in an egalitarian social structure (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

Face is self-worth based on others' assessments of whether the individual is fulfilling stable social role obligations (Heine, 2001; Ho, 1976; Kim & Cohen, 2010). Obligations are socially dictated, not freely chosen as in dignity cultures, and they are ongoing. They depend on the individual's status in stable social hierarchies such as families or organizations. Those with lower social status maintain face by fulfilling their duties and deferring to those of higher

social status. Those of higher social status maintain face by accepting the responsibility associated with their roles and protecting low-status others (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Fulfillment of role obligations preserves social harmony and stability. All of these characteristics of self-worth in face cultures mean that people in face cultures are generally not free to act autonomously and in self-interest as in dignity cultures. Rather, social interaction in face cultures reinforces the status quo to maintain stable social hierarchies. Social monitoring and sanctioning, characteristic of face cultures, mean that people who fail to consistently fulfill their social roles risk loss of face (Heine, 2001; Uchida & Kitayama, 2009).

Honor is self-worth based on an individual's reputation and also his/her own assessment of what others think. The meaning of honor is perhaps best understood by the Arabic and Persian word, "izzat", as having the reputation for being a moral person, yet someone who is tough and does not let others take advantage of him/her (Mandelbaum, 1988). Like having face, being honorable implies fulfilling ongoing social roles, but the method of doing so in the two types of culture is quite different. In the stable hierarchies that characterize face cultures, maintaining face requires deference and duty as described earlier. In the unstable and dynamic hierarchies that characterize honor cultures, achieving and protecting honor may require competitive actions to assert and protect not only one's own reputation, but also the reputation of families or *family-like* others such as close friends, tribes, or other close social groups (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008).¹¹

In honor cultures, whether social interaction is cooperative or competitive depends on whether people's reputations are threatened. If there is no threat to honor, people may pursue reputation by being very polite, warm, and hospitable (Bar, 2004; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & Rantilla, 1999; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). However, if the situation, like our study of negotiating a new business relationship, provides an opportunity to gain or a threat to lose reputation, people in honor cultures can be expected to act competitively or even aggressively (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Ijzerman, van Dijk, & Gallucci, 2007; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This active management of reputation in response to threats coexists with hierarchical social structures in honor cultures but means that these hierarchical structures are much less stable than those characteristic of face cultures.

Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes

Our model of culture, negotiation strategy, and outcomes (Figure 1) originates in the theorizing of Walton and McKersie (1965) and the early empirical studies of Pruitt (1981). The model is embedded in the motivational and behavioral tradition of research on negotiation (e.g., De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003; Olekalns & Smith, 2003; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). In adding culture to the model, as has been carried out in prior research (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011), we assume that cultural differences reside in people's cognitive structures that in turn influence negotiators' motivations and behaviors (Peterson & Barreto, 2014; Peterson & Wood, 2008). *Culture* in our model refers to whether negotiators are from a dignity, face, or honor culture.

¹¹The original social psychological research on culture of honor started with research with participants from the US south and showed that people in this region of the USA exhibited both values and behaviors consistent with culture of honor (Cohen et al., 1996; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). However, the study of honor culture in anthropology significantly predates the social psychological research (see, for example, the works of Bourdieu (1977) and Mandelbaum (1988) who studied Mediterranean, Indo-Pakistani, and Middle Eastern cultures). Contemporary research also suggests that the Middle East is culturally distinct from East Asia (Gupta & Hanges, 2004; Kabasakal & Dastmalchian, 2001; Peterson & Smith, 2008; Severance et al., 2013). For example, the GLOBE survey of cultural values was measured in-group or relational collectivism (referring to collectivism toward family and close friends) and institutional collectivism (referring to collectivism toward the broad community). Middle Eastern managers scored very high on relational collectivism, compared with East Asian managers, yet East Asian managers scored very high on social collectivism compared to Middle Eastern managers. These findings from the GLOBE Project demonstrate the need to distinguish honor and face cultures.




Figure 1. Process model of culture, strategy, and joint gains

A *competitive aspiration* is a desire to gain at the expense of the counterpart (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Messick & McClintock, 1968). Aspirations in general (Pruitt, 1981) and competitive aspirations in particular appear in many studies of negotiation strategy (see De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000 for a review). In our study, the construct of interest is not how much a negotiator aspires to gain but how much the negotiator aspires to outperform his/her counterpart, or gain relative to his/her counterpart.

Information sharing and influence are two strategies, or sets of goal directed behaviors that negotiators may use as they try to reach an agreement (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Past research (Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Weingart et al., 1990) has identified two generic types of strategy. Integrative strategy consists of behaviors that convey information about parties' interests and priorities. This information sharing is typically operationalized by questions, answers, statements conveying mutual interests, and recognizing trade-offs (Weingart et al., 2007). Distributive strategy consists of behaviors that try to influence the counterpart to make concessions. It is operationalized by all types of influence and persuasion ranging from threats to appeals to sympathy (Weingart et al., 2007). In Figure 1, we use the terms information sharing and influence to represent these two strategic perspectives.

Insight is negotiators' level of awareness of their counterparts' concerns, interests, and priorities (Pruitt, 1981; Thompson, 1991). Pruitt (1981) suggests and Thompson and Hastie (1990) show that with insight (as long as a negotiation has integrative potential), negotiators can trade off low priority issues or interests for high priority issues or interests and reach mutually beneficial deals with high *joint gains*. When insight into the counterpart's interests and priorities is not mutual, it can also promote one side winning at the expense of the other.

Joint gains are the sum of the negotiators' outcomes, or the total value of the agreement to both parties. Joint gains are the primary and classic criterion for evaluating the efficiency of the economic outcomes of negotiation (Teucher, Brett, & Gunia, 2013), and they are a key variable in Pruitt's (1981) model as well. Joint gains are valuable for more than economic reasons, as they can increase negotiators' satisfaction and willingness to implement the agreement (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006).

Negotiation in Dignity, Face, and Honor Cultures

In developing specific hypotheses regarding how dignity, face, and honor cultural differences will manifest in negotiation strategy and outcomes, we assume that people in a culture will be influenced by the logics of thought and action that have developed historically and continue to hold normative valence in their cultures (Vandello & Cohen, 2004). Through cultural socialization, people acquire cognitive structures that provide them with cultural expertise that functions as a "cultural accent and unconsciously guides their behavior, despite their consciously expressed personal values" (Peterson & Wood, 2008, page 30). However, we do not assume that people in a specific culture are completely homogenous in following cultural norms. Societies that share the core elements of dignity, face, or honor culture have sub-cultures (e.g., different regions and nations) with distinct features (Peterson & Smith, 2008).

We do not assume that cultural norms for negotiation strategy are the same in all contexts. Prior research on face (e.g., Liu et al., 2012) and honor (e.g., Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013) cultures shows that social context plays an important influence on negotiation behavior. For this reason, we develop hypotheses for the specific context of negotiating a new business relationship. Negotiating a new business relationship is the context of much prior negotiation strategy research (see Teucher et al., 2013 for a review). Thus, our study builds on prior negotiation strategy research in order to contribute to understanding of how culture affects negotiation strategy in these three types of culture.

In the next section, we develop hypotheses proposing that differences in the nature of self-worth and the hierarchical structure of social interaction in dignity, face, and honor cultures will manifest in negotiators' use of strategy and their outcomes. We propose that negotiations in honor cultures will be more competitive than negotiations in dignity cultures. We also propose competing hypotheses for face cultures. The interdependent, harmony-oriented, and stable hierarchical structure of social interaction in face cultures leads to a prediction of cooperative negotiations. However, negotiating a new business relationship (i.e., with a counterpart with whom one has had no prior relationship) may be viewed as occurring outside of established role hierarchies. One of the purposes of such a negotiation would be to develop a role hierarchy for the new relationship. Therefore, an alternative prediction is that in this context, face culture negotiators will compete to determine social dominance in the new business relationship.

Culture and competitive aspirations

Literature portrays negotiations as strategic interactions practiced by unemotional, rational actors pursuing self-interest, and economic gains (Curhan et al., 2006). This portrayal of negotiations is consistent with the conceptualization of self-worth and social interaction in dignity culture (Leung & Cohen, 2011) but may not carry over to honor and face cultures.

In honor cultures, negotiations to set up new business relationships are likely to be competitions between protagonists trying to achieve social gains (relative status) and promote their reputations for not being taken advantage of. This competitive orientation is likely even if negotiators have had a prior business relationship, because in honor cultures, social interactions like negotiations are opportunities to acquire highly coveted self-worth and social status even by taking another's honor to enhance one's own (Leung & Cohen, 2011). People in honor cultures act assertively and emotionally in the face of conflict (Cohen et al., 1996; Ijzerman et al., 2007; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002) to avoid the appearance of being weak (Cross, Uskul, Swing, Alokkan, & Ataca, 2013; Shafa, Beersma, Ellemers, & Harinck, 2013).

This theorizing leads us to predict that negotiators from honor cultures will have more competitive aspirations than negotiators from dignity cultures. To acquire honor, negotiators need to outperform their counterparts and gain at their counterparts' expense. This prediction is consistent with the unstable hierarchical structure of honor cultures and social interactions that emphasize social comparisons of relative status (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Competitive aspirations are also consistent with honor cultures' emphasis on defending honor from others who may try to appropriate it to advance their own self-worth (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

In contrast, negotiators in dignity cultures should be less concerned about outperforming counterparts and winning at their expense than those from honor cultures, because self-worth is intrinsically determined and social structures are more egalitarian and less contested. People in dignity cultures try to maintain social independence, pursue personal achievement, and focus on maximizing self-interest in social interactions such as negotiations (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Miller, 1999). This reasoning suggests that self-worth is not easily threatened by the relative outcome of a negotiation in dignity cultures, and so, negotiators' aspirations should be less dependent on social comparisons than in honor cultures. Dignity culture negotiators' aspirations to outperform the counterpart should be lower than those of honor culture negotiators. A study of disputing supports this reasoning. Participants from an honor culture (Qatar) held a more fixed-sum view of both economic and relational goals than those from a dignity culture (the USA; Tinsley, Turan, Aslani, & Weingart, 2011). Thus,

H1a: Negotiators from an honor culture will have higher competitive aspirations than negotiators from a dignity culture.

The prediction for competitive aspirations in face cultures depends on whether the context of negotiating a new business relationship is viewed as occurring inside or outside of established role hierarchies. If viewed as occurring within established role hierarchies, then cooperative behavior motivated by saving face and preserving harmony should prevail. In face cultures, people are generally not free to pursue self-interest and are expected to act in the best interest of the collective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Setting aspirations that are too competitive and negotiating to maximize own gain at the expense of another's gain are behaviors that risk jeopardizing social harmony and losing face. This reasoning suggests:

H1b: Negotiators from a face culture will have lower competitive aspirations than negotiators from a dignity or honor culture.

However, if negotiating a new business relationship is viewed as occurring outside of established role hierarchies, face culture negotiators are likely to have higher competitive aspirations than dignity culture negotiators. Co-existing with the norms of harmony and cooperation that can be traced to the influence of Confucian philosophy in face culture (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003) is competitive norms that can be traced to the 36 stratagems for prevailing over the enemy that make up the philosophy of Sun Tzu (Fang, 1999). Negotiations to set up a new business relationship may be viewed as an opportunity to establish dominance in the new relationship.

In a face culture, once an agreement with its implications for roles and responsibilities has been reached, the relationship is likely to be very stable. Unlike in honor cultures where hierarchies are frequently challenged, strong norms for harmony in ongoing relationships in face cultures sanction challenging a status hierarchy. The negotiation to set up the relationship is an opportunity, and possibly the only opportunity, to achieve high status in the relationship. This reasoning leads to the prediction that negotiations to set up new business relationships in face culture will be very competitive similar to what we predicted for honor cultures.

Empirical evidence supports this reasoning. In a study of online negotiations with Hong Kong Chinese (a face culture) and the USA (a dignity culture), Hong Kong Chinese negotiators made more extreme opening offers and attained higher distributive outcomes than the US negotiators (Rosette et al., 2012). Other research shows that Chinese negotiate new business relationships competitively and focus on outperforming counterparts (Liu et al., 2012; Lügger, Geiger, Neun, & Backhaus, 2015; Zhang, Brett, & Zhang, 2013), except when they are negotiating with an in-group member and under high accountability (Liu et al., 2012).

H1b': Negotiators from a face or honor culture will have higher competitive aspirations than negotiators from a dignity culture.

Culture and influence

Influence in negotiations refers to all types of negative emotional expression, such as anger, frustration, sadness, hatred, disapproval, contempt, ridicule, and accusations (Brett et al., 2007; Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004) as well as emotional appeals, such as requests for fairness, sympathy, and taking responsibility (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). A negotiator using influence may expect a counterpart to concede for several reasons: to stop the negotiator from acting on the threat and thereby end the negative emotional state that is threatening to the counterpart's self-worth (Van Kleef, 2009); to signal that the counterpart recognizes the negotiator's superior position (Van Kleef, 2009); or to remind the counterpart to accept his/her role responsibilities in a social hierarchy (Brett & Gelfand, 2006).

People in honor cultures use emotions to influence others more than people from dignity cultures. For example, they are more likely to experience and display negative emotions than people from dignity cultures (Bar, 2004; Ijzerman et al., 2007; Pely, 2011) who strive to divorce social-emotional dynamics from professional interactions (Sanchez-Burks, 2005; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2008). In honor cultures, open expression of negative emotions signals that the individual is hurt, insulted, or angry and must be appeased (Bar, 2004). People in honor cultures also react to insults by expressing intense negative emotions (e.g., Beersma, Harinck, & Gerts, 2003; Cohen et al., 1996; Cross et al., 2013; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008).

We expect this cultural difference in propensity to express negative emotions, and use of influence in social interactions will extend to negotiations. Even if no actual insult occurs, the competitive and contentious dynamics of negotiation seem likely to lead honor culture negotiators to perceive insult and thus react defensively and emotionally by using influence to elicit concessions more readily than dignity culture negotiators.

H2a: Negotiators from an honor culture will use influence more than negotiators from a dignity culture.

We also propose dual hypotheses about the use of influence in face cultures. A predominant view is that norms in face culture emphasize the suppression of negative emotions in social interactions to avoid jeopardizing harmony (Boiger, Güngör, Karasawa, & Mesquita, 2014; Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998; Matsumoto, Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008; Yuki, Maddux, & Masuda, 2007). Three characteristics of face cultures explain why norms to avoid jeopardizing harmony decrease the probability of using influence or insults, norms of indirect confrontation deter aggressive reciprocation of influence and retaliation of insults, and hierarchy provides an institutionalized, although indirect, channel for face-saving in resolution of conflict through involvement of high-status third parties (Brett, Behfar, & Sanchez-Burks, 2014; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Tinsley, 2004). All these norms predict that negotiators in face culture should express negative emotions less and use influence less than negotiators in dignity cultures.

H2b: Negotiators from a face culture will use influence less than negotiators from a dignity or honor culture.

Despite this reasoning, accumulating research suggests that negotiators from a face culture use influence attempts more than negotiators from a dignity culture. Adair et al. (2001) reported that Japanese managers used influence and offers more than US managers and this pattern held when Adair and Brett (2005) aggregated their Japanese data with data from Hong Kong, Thai, and Russian negotiators, comparing their use of strategy with that of US negotiators aggregated with German, Swedish, and Israeli negotiators. Recent studies found that Chinese negotiators relied more heavily on influence and offers and expressed negative emotions more frequently than negotiators from dignity cultures of the USA and Germany (Liu et al., 2012; Lügger et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2013).

One explanation may be that the norms that govern cooperative interactions are largely missing from deal-making negotiations (Donahue, Lewicki, & Robert, 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). In face cultures, a context that lacks the institutional monitoring and sanctioning that is pervasive in so many other realms of the society may unleash social behavior that is otherwise sanctioned (Liu et al., 2012). In other words, the norms for harmony, indirect confrontation, and deference to hierarchy—which bring stability to ongoing social relationships in face cultures—may not govern the process of negotiating new business relationships, if such negotiations are viewed as occurring outside of established role hierarchies. Another explanation is that making emotional influence appeals (e.g., asking for sympathy) is consistent with the hierarchical structure of face culture. Such appeals remind people of their roles and responsibilities (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Therefore, our alternative hypothesis suggests:

H2b': Negotiators from a face or an honor culture will use influence more than negotiators from a dignity culture.

Figure 1 also suggests that competitive aspirations may mediate the relationship between culture and the use of influence. Competitive aspirations cue a relative analysis—how well am I doing compared with the counterpart.

Being outperformed by another is threatening to self-image and produces negative affect (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). Negotiators may thus rely heavily on influence to avoid being dominated by the counterpart.

H3: Competitive aspirations will mediate the relationship between culture and influence.

Culture and information sharing

Information sharing, the rounds of questions and answers focused on understanding a counterpart's interests and priorities, is the most reliable strategy used by negotiators globally to generate joint gains (Brett, 2014). Cultural and contextual factors that frame negotiations as competitions for status should cue defensiveness, discouraging negotiators from answering questions about their own interests and priorities out of the fear of being taken advantage of, and to bypass the trap of expected reciprocity. In contrast, cultural factors that frame negotiations as problems to be solved seem likely to cue information sharing. Several studies show face culture (Liu & Wilson, 2011; Lügger et al., 2015) or honor culture (Gunia et al., 2011) negotiators engaging in less information sharing than dignity culture negotiators. This reasoning and analysis of the empirical literature suggest two implications. First, negotiators from a dignity culture will use information sharing more than negotiators from an honor culture. Second, if face culture negotiators are treating negotiation as occurring outside of any ongoing role relationship, they will use information sharing less than negotiators from dignity culture. Therefore,

H4a: Negotiators from a dignity culture will use information sharing more than negotiators from honor cultures.

H4b: Negotiators from a dignity culture will use information sharing more than negotiators from face cultures.

However, if face culture negotiators are treating negotiation as occurring within ongoing role relationships, they should use information sharing similarly to the way negotiators from a dignity culture use information sharing and more than honor culture negotiators.

H4c: Negotiators from a face culture will use information sharing more than negotiators from an honor culture.

We expect that competitive aspirations will have a negative effect on information sharing. Negotiators who view the relationship in terms of equity and dominance typically do not engage in information sharing out fear of exploitation (Olekalns & Smith, 2003). Thus, we expect a negative relationship between competitive aspirations and information sharing.

H5: Negotiators with high competitive aspirations will engage in less information sharing than negotiators with low competitive aspirations.

Information sharing, insight, and joint gains

Insight is an understanding of the relative differences between own and other's priorities and interests. It can be used to achieve mutually beneficial trade-offs and joint gains (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). When insight is not mutual, it can also promote one side winning at the expense of the other. Several studies show that it is possible to attain insight from direct information sharing regardless of culture (U.S. & China: Brett & Okumura, 1998; India: Gunia et al., 2011; U.S.: Thompson & Hastie, 1990; China: Zhang et al., 2013). Thus, we expect that insight will be higher in cultures in which negotiators engage in more information sharing.

H6: Negotiators who engage in more information sharing will have more accurate insight than negotiators who engage in less information sharing.

We also propose that information sharing and insight will mediate the relationship between culture and joint gains, such that negotiators from cultures that engage in more information sharing are more likely to generate accurate insight. Assuming that there is an integrative potential in a negotiation, negotiators engaging in more information sharing and acquiring more insight are more likely to generate joint gains than negotiators from cultures that engage in less information sharing and acquire less insight.

H7: Information sharing and insight will mediate the relationship between culture and joint gains.

Influence and Insight

It is theoretically possible that insight can be attained indirectly by inferring interests and priorities from patterns of influence attempts and offers (Pruitt, 1981). However, Adair et al. (2001) are the only empirical evidence of negotiators doing this. Other studies show either no relationship between the uses of influence with insight or a negative relationship (e.g., Gunia et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013). Instead, these studies show that Indian and Chinese negotiators rely heavily on influence but their use of influence does not predict insight or joint gains.

Influence attempts including negative emotional tactics may crowd out information sharing about priorities and interests. Engaging in and deflecting influence attempts may overwhelm the cognitive effort (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994) required to draw inferences from influence attempts and patterns of offers (Pruitt, 1981) and shift the focus to retaliation (Friedman et al., 2004). When influence attempts dominate, negotiators may feel defensive, threatened, lose perspective, and become less cooperative and receptive to other's ideas. For these reasons, we do not expect that negotiators relying heavily on influence will gain insight and that the use of influence and lack of insight will result in lower joint gains.

H8: Negotiators who engage in more influence will have less accurate insight than negotiators who engage in less influence tactics.

H9: Influence and insight will mediate the relationship between culture and joint gains.

Culture and distribution of gains in dyads

In theory (Walton & McKersie, 1965) and in empirical research, individual gains in negotiation are a function of the use of influence strategy (Liu & Wilson, 2011; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996; Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006; see also (Geiger, 2012) where aspirations predicted individual profit). Sullivan et al. (2006) also found that studying individual gains in multi-issue negotiations with integrative potential is complicated not only by interdependence between negotiators but also by the fact that the more value negotiators create, the more they have to claim (c.f., Exhibit 1.2 Brett, 2014). Nevertheless, the evidence that individual gains are related to the use of influence in negotiations suggests that if there are cultural differences in the use of influence, there may also be cultural implications regarding the equal versus unequal distribution of gains. Because we expect that honor culture negotiators will use influence more than dignity culture negotiators, we predict that the distribution of gains will be less balanced in honor than in dignity culture negotiations. Depending on whether face culture negotiators use influence more or

less than dignity or honor culture negotiators (H2b, and H2b'), face culture negotiators may have more or less balanced distribution of gains than dignity culture negotiators.

H10a: Negotiators from an honor culture will have a less balanced distribution of gains than negotiators from a dignity culture.

H10b: Negotiators from a face culture will have a more balanced distribution of gains than negotiators from a dignity or honor culture.

H10b': Negotiators from a face or honor culture will have a less balanced distribution of gains than negotiators from a dignity culture.

Methods

Descriptive norms study for dignity, face, and honor norms

To justify using the USA, China, and Qatar as exemplars of dignity, face, and honor cultures, we first collected descriptive norms data from students at the same schools from which our hypothesis-testing samples were ultimately drawn. We did not collect norm data in the hypothesis-testing study, because we did not want to prejudice or prime participants to be sensitive to culture.

In the descriptive norms study, the Caucasian American sample had 94 participants. The mean age was 20.5 years ($SD = 1.3$, $Range = 18$ to 24); 69% were female. The Chinese sample had 64 participants; the mean age was 30.4 years ($SD = 5.7$, $Range = 17$ to 42), and 67% were female. The Qatari sample had 76 participants; the mean age was 20.0 years ($SD = 1.5$, $Range = 18$ to 24), and 59% were female. Most participants (82%) in the Qatari sample were Arab nationals; the rest were from other non-Arab Muslim countries in the region such as Pakistan, Iran, and Bangladesh. Dropping non-Arabs did not change the significant findings.

Descriptive norms are social perceptions: cultural members' beliefs about ways to think, feel, or act that are widely endorsed as appropriate in their society, community, or group (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Descriptive norms are theoretically more relevant and empirically more powerful than individual values in predicting differences in behavior between cultures (Peterson & Barreto, 2014; Peterson & Wood, 2008; Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Zou et al., 2009). They also minimize self-presentational biases, that is, tendency of respondents to adjust their responses by comparing themselves with other people in their own societies (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010). We asked participants to report "*how frequently do people in your culture think, feel, or act in the ways described in each question*". Items were taken from Severance and Gelfand (2013) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002). The Severance and Gelfand honor scale had low reliability and was dropped.

Sample items for dignity norm were "People should stand up for what they believe in even when others disagree" and "How much a person respects himself is far more important than how much others respect him" (USA: $\alpha = .75$; China: $\alpha = .77$; Qatar, $\alpha = .78$). Sample items for face norm were "It is important to maintain harmony within one's group" and "People should control their behavior in front of others" (USA: $\alpha = .76$; China: $\alpha = .70$; Qatar: $\alpha = .66$). Sample items for honor norm were "People are concerned about the reputation of their families" and "People do not allow others to insult their family" (USA: $\alpha = .86$; China: $\alpha = .77$; Qatar, $\alpha = .78$).

As a sampling check, we compared how different groups responded to each norm. Figure 2 shows significant differences between cultural groups. As expected, Americans ($M = 4.87$, $SD = 0.81$) scored higher than the others on the dignity norm ($F(2, 232) = 4.43$, $p < .05$). There were no significant differences between Chinese ($M = 4.57$,




Figure 2. Cultural differences in descriptive norms of dignity, face, and honor

$SD=0.93$), and Qataris ($M=4.43$, $SD=1.18$) on the dignity norm. Chinese ($M=5.67$, $SD=0.51$) scored significantly higher than the others on the face norm ($F(2, 232)=41.86$, $p<.001$), and post-hoc analysis indicated that Qataris ($M=5.38$, $SD=0.85$) were higher than Americans ($M=4.63$, $SD=0.80$) on the face norm ($p<.05$). Qataris ($M=6.56$, $SD=0.62$) scored significantly higher on the honor norm ($F(2, 232)=71.15$, $p<.001$) than Chinese ($M=5.87$, $SD=0.53$) and Americans ($M=5.05$, $SD=1.02$). Post-hoc analysis indicated that Chinese were significantly higher than Americans on this norm ($p<.001$). Overall, these differences justified our choice of the USA, China, and Qatar as exemplars of dignity, face, and honor cultures and of student samples from these countries, because the students described their country's culture in terms consistent with theory.

Hypothesis testing study—negotiation simulation

We used *The Sweet Shop* negotiation simulation (negotiationexercises.com). Participants took the roles of the owners of a bakery and an ice-cream shop, who were told they had no previous relationship with one another, but that both were interested in expanding and potentially sharing space in a new location. They negotiated four core issues (staffing, temperature, maintenance, and design) and two optional issues (website design and cold delivery service). Two of the core issues, (staffing and design) could be traded to create joint value; one issue (maintenance) was fully distributive, and one issue (temperature) was compatible in that both parties preferred warmer store temperatures.

Hypothesis testing study—sample

Participants were undergraduate students in social sciences and the humanities at prestigious universities with highly competitive entrance requirements in the USA, Qatar, and China. They were not enrolled in a negotiation class. None of these universities offered an experiential learning negotiation class to undergraduates. The American sample had 63 dyads; the mean age was 20.4 years ($SD=1.2$, $Range=18$ to 24), and 68% were female. The Chinese sample had 49 dyads. Information on their age was not collected directly, but we estimate that their mean age was about 19, because most were college freshmen; 53% were female. The Qatari sample had 68 dyads; the mean age was 21.2 years ($SD=1.36$, $Range=19$ to 28), and 50% were female. The study materials were originally written in English. Qatari and American students were in English language universities. Chinese students were studying in Chinese, so their study materials were translated and back translated according to standard methods (Brislin, 1980).

The sampling check found the US students described their culture as consistent with dignity. However, because the early research on culture of honor was carried out by contrasting participants from northern and southern US states (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), we also tested for differences because of the origins of the US hypothesis-testing sample. We coded the state in which participants attended high school and then defined South consistent with past research on Southern honor cultures (Cohen et al., 1996), as census divisions 5, 6, and 7 including the states of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas. Of 126 US participants, 18 were from the South. There were no significant differences in competitive aspirations of Northern ($M=57.08$, $SD=10.42$), and Southern ($M=58.82$, $SD=13.64$) participants. Of 63 US dyads, 48 were solely composed of Northerners; 12 had a Southern participant, and 3 had two Southern participants. This resulted in 15 “South” dyads with at least one Southern participant. There were no significant differences in reported influence between North ($M=2.17$, $SD=0.73$) and South ($M=2.25$, $SD=0.59$) dyads. There were no significant differences in reported information sharing between North ($M=5.48$, $SD=0.81$) and South ($M=5.35$, $SD=0.75$) dyads. There were no significant differences in joint gains between North ($M=15862.50$, $SD=1108.69$) and South ($M=15680.00$, $SD=1035.92$) dyads. Excluding Southerners from the US sample did not change the significance of the differences between the USA and China and the USA and Qatar, although the effects became slightly stronger.

Hypothesis testing study—procedures

Data collection was carefully calibrated via explicit experimenter instructions and coordinated training. All three sites used the following procedures in a laboratory-type setting. Participants (i) signed a consent form, (ii) were randomly assigned a negotiation counterpart and a role as a bakery or ice-cream store owner, (iii) were given 30 minutes to prepare, (iv) answered questions about their competitive aspirations, (v) were given 30 minutes to negotiate, and (vi) reported negotiation results and completed a post-questionnaire measuring strategies and insight.

Hypothesis testing study—measures

Culture

We used university attended and selective sampling to identify participants from Caucasian American culture, Chinese culture, and Middle Eastern culture. The US participants were American citizens and self-identified as ethnically Caucasian. All Chinese participants were born and raised in the People’s Republic of China. Slightly over half the Qatari participants listed Qatar as their home culture; the rest identified themselves as from different Middle Eastern Arab cultures (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and United Arab Emirates), and one non-Arab culture, but nonetheless Muslim culture, Pakistan.

Competitive aspirations

Aspirations were measured after preparation, just prior to the negotiation. The question was “*what percentage of the value in the negotiation do you expect to claim for yourself?*” The scale was thermometer style with 11 options ranging from 0% to 100% with 10% as the interval (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The single item measurement of this construct has a long history in research (e.g., Knight & Kagan, 1977). Past research also shows that before any social interaction takes place, negotiators are capable of estimating and reporting their own target and reservation prices (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), of reporting their confidence in their forthcoming performance (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007), and even guessing the other party’s reservation price (Larrick & Wu, 2007).

Negotiation strategies

The post questionnaire used 7-point Likert scales with anchors ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree to measure use of influence and information sharing. There were 10 influence and 8 information-sharing questions. Items were adopted from prior studies measuring these strategies (Gunia et al., 2011; Weingart et al., 1990).

Confirmatory factor analysis showed that information sharing and influence were empirically discriminant. We focused on the relative goodness of fit of the two and one factor models (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). The two-factor model ($\chi^2 = 525.14$, $df = 134$, RMSEA = 0.090, CFI = 0.77) fits much better than the one-factor model ($\chi^2 = 852.97$, $df = 135$, RMSEA = 0.122, CFI = 0.58), suggesting that these two strategies were empirically distinct from each other. Sample items for information sharing were “*During the negotiation, the other party shared information about his/her priorities*” and “*During the negotiation, the other party asked me about my needs*” (USA: $\alpha = .74$; China, $\alpha = .71$; Qatar: $\alpha = .73$). Sample items for influence were “*During the negotiation, I faked anger to put pressure on the other party*”, “*During the negotiation, I tried to put pressure on the other party*”, “*In the negotiation, I tried to persuade by asking for sympathy*” (US: $\alpha = .78$; China: $\alpha = .70$; Qatar: $\alpha = .80$).

Insight

We measured insight by asking participants to report how important each issue was to them and to their counterparts (cf. Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gunia et al., 2011). The issue, staff, was more important to the baker than to the ice-cream seller; the issue store design was more important to the ice-cream seller than the baker. To compute relative insight, we subtracted the baker’s estimate of the importance of the staff to the ice-cream seller from the baker’s estimate of the importance of staff to the baker. A high score indicated insight on the part of the baker. We did the same with the ice-cream seller’s top issue, store design, such that a high score indicated the ice-cream seller had insight. Because we used insight to predict group level joint gains, we added the two negotiators’ insight scores.

Joint gains

Joint gains were the sum of the two parties’ individual gains; maximum possible was 18 400 points. All US (63) and Chinese (49) dyads reached agreement. All but two of the 68 dyads in Qatar reached agreement. These two dyads were excluded from analysis of economic outcomes, although including them in the analysis by giving each negotiator 4000 points (equal to their reservation price) did not change the results.

Distribution of gains

We calculated two dyadic-level indicators of the distribution of gains. We calculated the *absolute difference in gains* within each dyad by subtracting the individual gain of the ice-cream seller from the baker and extracting the absolute value of that difference. We calculated the *percentage of difference in gains* by dividing the absolute difference in gains by the total joint gains within a dyad. This value was multiplied by 100%.

Hypothesis testing study—data analysis

To test the effects of culture on pre-negotiation competitive aspirations (H1), we used analysis of variance at the individual level. We used the dyad as the unit for all other analyses. For strategies and insight, we aggregated to the dyadic mean. To test the effects of culture on strategies and outcomes (H2, H4, and H10), we used analysis of variance at the dyad level. We used linear regression to test H5, H6, and H8, and indirect effect macros (Hayes, 2012) to test H3, H7 and H9. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations at the dyad level. For all hypothesis test analysis, results were not affected by gender (details available from the authors).

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and dyad-level correlations

All cultures	<i>M (SD)</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Competitive aspirations	60.08 (8.29)	—	—	—	—	—
2. Influence	3.07 (1.02)	.383**	—	—	—	—
3. Information sharing	4.92 (0.90)	-.152*	-.397**	—	—	—
4. Insight	1.44 (2.23)	.070	-.159*	.232**	—	—
5. Joint gains	15461.1 (1317.71)	.094	-.154*	.250**	.468**	—

Note: Correlations at the dyad level. Joint gains are aggregated by adding individual gains, and the rest of the variables are averaged.

• Unlike in the analysis conducted for testing H1, which was carried out at the individual level, aspirations were aggregated and measured at the dyad level to make their measurement consistent with other variables in this table.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Results

The model in Figure 1 proposes that culture affects negotiation outcomes via competitive aspirations, strategy, and insight. There were significant cultural differences in joint gains ($F(2, 177) = 4.93$, $p < .01$), USA ($M = 15819.05$, $SD = 1086.41$), China ($M = 15485.71$, $SD = 1161.89$), and Qatar ($M = 15111.76$, $SD = 1528.00$). Post-hoc comparisons showed Qataris' joint gains were not different from those of the Chinese but were significantly lower than those of the Americans ($t(1, 129) = 3.03$, $p = .003$). Chinese joint gains were lower than those of the Americans, but this difference was not significant ($t(1, 110) = 1.56$, $p = .12$).

Culture and competitive aspirations

H1a predicted that negotiators from an honor culture would have higher competitive aspirations than negotiators from a dignity culture. Results showed a main effect of culture on competitive aspirations ($F(2, 352) = 6.62$, $p < .01$). Simple contrasts showed that the Qataris ($M = 60.81$, $SD = 12.48$) had higher competitive aspirations than the Americans ($M = 57.32$, $SD = 10.87$; $t(257) = -2.40$, $p < .001$), consistent with H1a. We had two alternative hypotheses (H1b and H1b') for cultural differences in competitive aspirations between face, honor and dignity cultures. Supporting H1b', the Chinese negotiators' aspirations ($M = 62.71$, $SD = 9.79$) were more competitive than the Americans ($t(217) = -3.803$, $p < .001$), but there were no significant differences in competitive aspirations of the Chinese and the Qataris ($t(227) = -1.92$, $p = .19$).

Culture, competitive aspirations, and influence

H2a predicted that negotiators in honor cultures would use influence more than negotiators in dignity cultures. A one-way analysis of variance at the dyad level showed significant differences between cultures ($F(2, 178) = 67.28$, $p < .001$). Supporting H2a, simple contrasts showed that the Qataris ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 0.94$) reported using more influence than Americans ($M = 2.19$, $SD = 0.70$; $t(129) = 8.09$, $p < .001$). Supporting H2b', Chinese reported using more influence ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 0.58$) than Americans ($t(107) = 12.99$, $p < .001$). Chinese also reported using more influence than the Qataris ($t(114) = 2.82$, $p = .006$).

A simple mediation analysis to evaluate H3—that negotiators' competitive aspirations would account for the relationship between culture and negotiators' use of influence—is not possible with a three-level categorical independent variable (here, culture; Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Hayes and Preacher (2014) advise building two contrast codes, (our first one compares USA with China and Qatar; our second one compares China and Qatar), and then

running indirect effects analyses using MEDIANTE macro. In the first analysis, culture indirectly affected influence through competitive aspirations (point estimate = .104, bootstrap 95% confidence interval (CI) = .031 to .217). Face and honor culture negotiators' more competitive aspirations accounted for their greater use of influence relative to dignity culture negotiators'. The second contrast (China vs. Qatar) was not significant. This indicates that consistent with H3, the mediation effect occurs for the three cultures when face and honor are taken together.

To further investigate H3, we analyzed the dynamic relationship between actor and partner's competitive aspirations and actor's reported use of influence with the actor-partner interdependence model (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). This test allowed us to evaluate the implications of negotiators' and their counterparts' aspirations on their strategies. Results showed that both a focal negotiator's own ($\beta = .079$, $t(170) = 2.91$, $p = .002$) and the counterpart's ($\beta = .069$, $t(170) = 2.53$, $p = .006$) competitive aspirations were positively related to the negotiator's reported use of influence. The higher a negotiator and the counterpart's competitive aspirations, the more the negotiator used influence, which further supported H3.

Culture, competitive aspirations, and information sharing

Results were consistent with H4a and H4b that predicted that negotiators from dignity cultures would use information sharing more than negotiators from honor and face cultures ($F(2, 350) = 25.84$, $p < .001$). Supporting H4a and H4b, simple contrasts showed that US negotiators reported more information sharing ($M = 5.45$, $SD = 0.95$) than the Qataris ($M = 4.64$, $SD = 1.03$; $t(129) = -5.92$, $p < .001$) and the Chinese ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 1.06$; $t(109) = -5.05$, $p < .001$). There were no differences in information sharing between Qataris and Chinese ($t(114) = .05$, $p = .952$); thus, H4c was not supported.

A regression analysis supported H5 that competitive aspirations would reduce information sharing ($\beta = -.152$, $t(178) = -2.05$, $p = .042$). The indirect effect of culture on information sharing through competitive aspirations was not significant.

Information sharing, insight, and joint gains

A regression analysis supported H6 that information sharing would be associated with insight ($\beta = .232$, $t(178) = 3.18$, $p = .002$).

Because both insight and information sharing were measured after the negotiation, we cannot test their causal order. But to determine if either insight or information sharing mediated the effect of culture on joint gains (H7), we used the procedure described earlier for H3. Information sharing and insight mediated the effect between culture and joint gains in the first contrast distinguishing the USA from China and Qatar (point estimate = -83.014, bootstrap 95% CI = -182.912 to -11.604). Only insight (not information sharing) mediated the effect on joint gains for the contrast between China and Qatar (point estimate = 216.449, bootstrap 95% CI = 33.742 to 425.801). Chinese high-joint-gains-negotiators had more insight though; they engaged in no more information sharing than Qatari high-joint-gains-negotiators.

Influence, insight, and joint gains

A regression analysis supported H8 predicting that influence would be negatively associated with insight ($\beta = -.159$, $t(178) = 2.14$, $p = .034$). H9 predicted that influence would mediate the effect of culture on insight and joint gains. We used the procedure described for H7 to test H9. The omnibus mediation tests were not significant.

Distribution of gains in dyads

H10a predicted a less balanced distribution of gains in honor than dignity cultures, and H10b and H10b'' were competing hypotheses comparing the distribution of gains in face and dignity cultures. Multiple analysis of variance analyses showed a main effect of culture on the absolute difference in gains ($F(2, 175) = 12.77, p < .01$) and the percentage of difference in gains ($F(2, 175) = 13.74, p < .01$). The simple contrast supported H10a; the Qataris had a larger win-lose distribution compared with the Americans as illustrated by the Qataris' higher absolute difference in gains ($M = 3290.91, SD = 2220.51$) and higher percentage of difference in gains ($M = 21.47, SD = 17.46$) compared with the Americans' absolute difference in gains ($M = 1653.97, SD = 1360.83; t(127) = 5.02, p < .001$) and Americans' percentage of difference in gains ($M = 10.28, SD = 9.36; t(110) = 2.87, p = .005$).

Results also support H10b' as the Chinese had a larger win-lose distribution compared with the Americans as illustrated by the Chinese negotiators' higher absolute difference in gains ($M = 2530.61, SD = 1874.63; t(110) = 2.86, p = .005$) and their higher percentage of difference in gains ($M = 17.21, SD = 16.58; t(110) = 2.98, p = .004$).

Finally, the Qataris had a larger win-lose distribution compared with the Chinese as illustrated by the Qatari negotiators' higher absolute difference in gains ($t(114) = -1.93, p = .055$), and their higher percentage of difference in gains ($t(113) = -1.82, p = .072$).

Note on family honor

In addition to the four issues that all negotiators had to resolve to reach agreement, there were two optional issues, cold delivery and web design, which, if included in the agreement, could bring additional value to either or both negotiators. Cold delivery (800 points) had purely economic value to both negotiators, but web design (500 points) had both family significance and economic value. Negotiators had to decide whether to hire the ice-cream seller's brother to design the joint website. The bakery preferred to hire a professional.

We anticipated that the web design issue would be more important to negotiators from Qatar than those from the USA or China, because protecting and defending family is a pivotal element of honor culture (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002). Results supported this assertion. Qataris in the ice-cream shop role ($M = 3.54, SD = 0.13$) rated this family related issue (web design) as more important than did Americans ($M = 2.76, SD = 0.12$) or Chinese ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.15; F(2, 153) = 9.45, p < .001$). Qataris in the bakery role ($M = 3.509, SD = 0.16$) also rated web design as more important to their counterparts than Americans ($M = 2.76, SD = 0.15$) or Chinese ($M = 2.98, SD = 0.18; F(2, 151) = 5.65, p < .01$). These results support the idea that in honor cultures, protecting family can be an important concern in business interactions.

Discussion

A summary of results

The study identified two distinct strategic paths that account for cultural variation in the negotiation of joint gains. The more competitive path characterized many Qatari and Chinese negotiations and led to lower joint gains relative to American negotiations. The more cooperative path characterized the American more than the Qatari or Chinese negotiations and led to higher joint gains. The competitive path—predicted from the differences in self-worth and the stability of social structures between dignity, face, and honor cultures—was set to unfold before these negotiations of a new business relationship even began. It started with Qatari and Chinese negotiators' higher aspirations to claim value at the expense of the counterpart, which in turn predicted their heavy reliance on influence. Negotiators who relied on influence to gain concessions from counterparts also divided gains more unequally. In contrast, the

cooperative path linked information sharing and insight and high joint gains—results that are consistent with predictions of differences in self-worth and the stability of social structure in dignity compared with face and honor cultures. The American negotiators' higher joint gains were because they relied on information sharing more heavily than the Qataris or the Chinese.

Limitations, strengths, and future directions

As in all empirical studies, this one has both design strengths and weaknesses. For example, although we had theory and prior research and pre-tested descriptive norm data to justify our choice of the USA, China, and Qatar as exemplars of the dignity, face, honor cultures, and although national boundaries generally provide rather good proxies for cultural boundaries (House et al., 2004; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012; Peterson & Smith, 2008), our study does not rule out the possibility that people in other honor, face, or dignity cultures may negotiate differently from those we studied. Despite this limitation, the Qatar sample provides a stronger basis for generalizability to people from other nations in Middle Eastern honor cultures, because it was more heterogeneous in terms of nationality than the more homogeneous US and China samples.

Using student samples, as we did, is very common in negotiation research, and there is a lot of evidence that results from student and managerial samples are consistent. (For dignity culture, see Adair and Brett (2005), and Gunia et al. (2011); for face culture, see Lügger et al. (2015) and Zhang et al. (2013); for honor culture, see Gunia et al. (2011). Nevertheless, students in their late adolescence continue to experience changes in brain structure into adulthood (Tamnes et al., 2010) that may affect their cognitive and affiliative needs, as well as their levels of confrontation and aggression (Eisenberg, 2000). Therefore, the fact that our samples were relatively young may have influenced their use of negotiation strategy and their outcomes. The students in our studies also were not fully representative of the populations of their nations or even of university students in their nations. They were all attending elite universities and so should be more representative of those who are likely to take future leadership positions in their countries' economic sectors than the population in general in these countries.

Our study was set in the context of most research on negotiation strategy. The setting of negotiating a new business relationship introduced parties who had no prior relationship. This allowed us to compare and contrast our results with prior research on negotiation strategy that uses this setting. However, it does not allow us to generalize to other types of negotiations, for example, between parties with a prior relationship, which are disputing, or negotiating a one-time deal. Negotiations in ongoing business relationships may be less competitive than the negotiations in our study here. We would expect this reduction of competitiveness to be more likely in face cultures, than in honor and dignity cultures, because of the differences in the nature of self-worth and the stability of social hierarchies in these cultures. When parties in face cultures negotiate in an ongoing relationship, their status relationship has already been determined. Negotiating competitively in that context might threaten that stable relationship or damage social harmony.

The limitations of our study suggest opportunities to extend research on dignity, face, and honor culture and negotiation strategy in several ways. A high priority is studying negotiation strategy in other nations within the three cultural types. For example, are negotiations in Latin American cultures that are "looser" similar to what we found in the Middle East where cultures are "tighter" (Gelfand et al., 2011)? There has also not been much research comparing use of negotiation strategy in different types of negotiations. But, rather than simply comparing different types of negotiation within culture, our study calls for research that entertains the possibility of a complex interaction between type of culture and type of negotiation on use of strategy. In particular, there is an opportunity for future research on context and negotiation strategy, particularly in honor cultures. Theory suggests that in honor cultures, social interaction with close others, for instance with family, or with more distant others after trust has been established, is likely to be more cooperative than the competition that our study documented (Boiger et al., 2014; Pely, 2011; Shafa et al., 2013). Finally, are student negotiators more or less aggressive than their managerial

counterparts? Age has not been a variable in studies of negotiation strategy, perhaps it should be, especially if it interacts with cultural type.

Implications for theory and future research

This study illustrates the value of the dignity, face, and honor framework for cross-cultural research. The traditional framework would have treated Middle Eastern and East Asian cultures similarly and predicated, based on the collectivism, that negotiators in these cultures would be cooperative so as not to violate the collective norms of harmony and threaten status hierarchies. In addition, the traditional framework would predict that American negotiators would be more competitive than others in pursuing self-interest. The dignity, face, and honor framework implies different predictions based on the implications of the confluence of the differences in the nature of self-worth (dignity, accomplishments; face, fulfillment of social roles; honor, reputation) and social structures (dignity, unstable and egalitarian; face, stable and hierarchical; honor, unstable and hierarchical) in these cultures. Our results were consistent with the predictions about negotiation strategy inferred from the dignity-face-honor framework. The study demonstrates several theoretical implications for using this framework in cultural psychology and for cross-cultural research on negotiation strategy.

Dignity culture

The behaviors of the American negotiators—primarily their relatively lower competitive aspirations, their more cooperative and less aggressive motivational orientation, and their reliance on information sharing—were consistent with our theorizing that in dignity culture negotiation is more often approached with a problem-solving mindset to work cooperatively with the counterpart than with a competitive mindset to win at the expense of the counterpart. The dignity culture negotiators' competitive aspirations were lower than those of the honor or face culture negotiators and this resulted in their using less influence. Still, the Americans were motivated to engage in information sharing about interests and priorities which they used to generate more accurate insight and higher joint gains.

Face culture

The behaviors of the Chinese negotiators relative to the Americans, primarily their higher competitive aspirations and their reliance on influence, were consistent with our theorizing that in face cultures people are concerned about asserting self-worth and acquiring status when interacting outside of stable role relationships. The behaviors of the Chinese negotiators in this context were not consistent with what the classic theory of individualism–collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) would suggest. However, as previously discussed, our study does not allow generalization to negotiation contexts such as in on-going relationships. Whether Chinese will negotiate as competitively inside stable role relationships as they did in this study is an opportunity for future research.

Honor culture

The behaviors of the Qatari negotiators relative to Americans—primarily their highly competitive aspirations, aggressive motives, and reliance on influence—were consistent with the theorizing that in honor cultures, negotiations are approached as opportunities to win status at the expense of the counterpart. Qatari negotiators' competitive motivation and use of influence tactics showed them asserting their self-worth and trying to acquire status vis-à-vis the counterpart. The results were also consistent with prior research on response to insult and research on zero-sum mentality that in honor cultures, people view conflict as a situation to defend honor, and thus may behave very competitively.

Other opportunities for future theorizing and research are several intriguing differences in the Chinese and Qatari data. Despite similarities in competitive aspirations and the use of negotiation strategy, there were significant differences between Qataris and Chinese in the descriptive norms of face and family honor (in the sampling check study), and the family-related issue was significantly more important to the Qataris than Chinese negotiators. Collectivism does not account theoretically for these different orientations toward family in Qatar and China. Perhaps, future

research using the dignity-face-honor framework—with its distinction between self-worth based on reputation, fulfilling social roles, and achievement—can provide a stronger explanation for such differences. Another difference had to do with the Chinese negotiators' more accurate insight than the Qataris, despite their reporting using influence as much as the Qataris. Insight is not *generally* associated with use of influence (however, see Adair et al., 2001, for generating insight from offers and influence in a face culture sample). Although the Chinese negotiators' insight did not result in significantly higher joint gains than those negotiated by the Qataris, the Chinese gains were more evenly distributed than those of the Qataris.

Our study extends prior social and cultural psychological research on honor cultures. The insult studies (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) showed that confrontational emotional behaviors were a reciprocal response to provocation. Our study's actor-partner interdependence model results showed that a negotiator's use of confrontational influence tactics was a function of not only the negotiator's own competitive aspirations but also the counterpart's competitive aspirations. That is, negotiators' use of influence was not just a defensive move in response to the counterpart's provocation but was also an offensive move predicated by the negotiator's own competitive aspirations.

Practical implications

An important practical implication of this research is that highly competitive interaction should be anticipated when negotiators from face or honor cultures are at the table, at least when negotiating new business relationships. Accordingly, negotiators can plan their approach and use of strategy in anticipation of likely competitive behaviors at the negotiation table. For example, negotiators may take extra time to develop a trusting relationship with their face or honor culture counterpart before they begin to discuss the structure of the new business relationship. Once at the table, negotiators can identify influence attempts and then by not reciprocating them, try to change the negotiation's strategic trajectory. There is research to be carried out on how to redirect negotiators from culturally ingrained negotiation strategy. However, there is the potential that the dignity culture evidence of refusing to reciprocate competitive strategy (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998) will also work in face and honor cultures and in intercultural negotiations.

Conclusion

This comparative study of negotiation strategy in the USA, China, and Qatar tested hypotheses derived from cultural differences in self-worth and the stability of social structure as described in the relatively new dignity-face-honor framework in cultural psychology. This study shows that this framework provides insights into negotiators' use of strategy and their outcomes. By inferring how cultural differences in self-worth and the stability of social hierarchies would manifest in negotiations in the three cultural exemplars, USA, China, and Qatar, we generated and tested hypotheses proposing that both face and honor culture negotiators would be more competitive than dignity culture negotiators. The study's empirical findings provide evidence for the value of the dignity-face-honor conceptual framework for predicting and interpreting the ways people in these cultures use negotiation strategy.

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